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THE WTO PANEL DECISION ON AUSTRALIA'S
SALMON IMPORT GUIDELINES: EVIDENCE THAT THE
SPS AGREEMENT CAN EFFECTIVELY PROTECT
HUMAN HEALTH INTERESTS
Matthew D. Taylort
Abstract: On July 19, 1999, Australia lifted its ban on salmon imports and
announced new salmon import guidelines. The new guidelines were promulgated in
response to a World Trade Organization ("WTO") Appellate Body determination that the
import ban violated the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures ("SPS Agreement"). Canada challenged Australia's new import guidelines,
alleging that the new guidelines also violate the SPS Agreement. The WTO dispute
settlement panel held that, with the exception of only one provision, Australia's new
salmon import guidelines are based on appropriate scientific risk analyses and are now in
line with comparable import guidelines for non-salmonid fish. By rejecting most of
Canada's challenges and substantially upholding Australia's new import guidelines, the
dispute settlement panel demonstrated that the SPS Agreement can be used by WTO
member countries to protect their human health interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1975, Australia prohibited the importation of fresh, chilled, and
frozen salmonidt products from Canada by issuing Quarantine Proclamation
86A.2 This import ban was designed to protect diverse recreational
fisheries3 in Australia from exotic diseases. 4  Canada opposed the import
t The author would like to thank his wife, Dalia Williams Taylor, and his children, Summer and
Luke Taylor, for their patience and understanding while he spent many hours away from home writing this
Comment.
Salmonid is the name given to members of the Salmonidae and Plecoglossidae finfish families.
Non-salmonids are all other finfish species caught in marine or brackish waters. Australian Quarantine &
Inspection Service, Import Risk Analysis on Non-viable Salmonids and Non-salmonid Marine Finfish xii
(visited Dec. 20, 1999) <http://www.aqis.gov.au/docs/anpolicy/finalfinfish.pdf> [hereinafter 1999 IRA].
2 Quarantine Proclamation 86A prohibited
the importation into Australia of dead fish of the sub-order Salmonidae, or any parts (other than
semen or ova) of fish of that sub-order, in any form unless ... prior to importation into Australia
the fish or parts of fish have been subject to such treatment as in the opinion of the Director of
Quarantine is likely to prevent the introduction of any infectious or contagious disease, or
disease or pest affecting persons, animals or plants.
Quarantine Proclamation 86A, AUSTRALIAN Gov'T GAZETFE, No. 533, available in Australian Quarantine
and Inspection Service, Salmon Import Risk Analysis-Draft 1995 app. 1 (Feb. 21, 1995)
<http://www.aqis.gov.au/docs/anpolicy/ appendices.doc> [hereinafter 1995 Draft IRA].
3 Australia's marine fauna include more than 3,600 species of fish in 303 families, and Australia
ranks as the third largest fishing zone in the world. The gross value of Australia's fishery production from
1997 through 1998 was 1.86 billion Australian dollars (approximately 1.1 billon United States dollars).
1999 IRA, supra note 1, at 43.
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ban, arguing that salmon products for human consumption were not
associated with the spread of salmon diseases. 5 Canadian authorities further
contended that the microorganisms of concern to Australia were unlikely to
be present in headless, eviscerated salmon in concentrations sufficient to
transmit exotic diseases.6
At Canada's request, the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
established a dispute settlement panel7 in April 1997 to resolve the conflict
over Australia's import ban.8 Canada alleged, among other things, that the
ban was inconsistent with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement"). 9 The SPS Agreement is an
agreement annexed to the WTO Agreement l° that allows member countries
to adopt and enforce trade restrictions that are "necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health."" Australia argued that the import ban was a
scientifically grounded measure that would protect indigenous fish species
from exotic disease and was therefore permissible under the SPS
Agreement. 12  In June 1998, the dispute settlement panel ruled against
Australia.13  Australia appealed the panel's ruling. 14  In October 1998, the
Appellate Body, which is the body that hears appeals of dispute settlement
4 1995 Draft IRA, supra note 2, background § 2.1.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Dispute settlement panels settle trade disagreements that arise between WTO members. WORLD
TRADE ORG., GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 17-19 (1999) [hereinafter GUIDE]. A panel is
composed of three to five "well-qualified governmental or non-governmental individuals" who are
independent and of diverse background and have wide experience. Id. at 21. Appropriate persons are
former panel members, former government representatives to the WTO or the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), or those who have taught or published on international trade law or policy.
Id.; see also infra Part II.C. 1.
8 Australian Quarantine & Inspection Service, Revised Fish Import Guidelines Announced,
attachment B, Chronology of Events Relating to the Fish Import Risk Analyses and the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) Process (media release) (July 19, 1999) <http://www.aqis.gov.au/docs/pr/
salmonattachb.htm> [hereinafter Chronology of Events].
' See Overview of WTO Disputes, Australia-Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmonids
(visited Nov. 10, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm#_Toc466793428> [hereinafter
Overview]; see also Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex IA, available in WTO Goods, Agriculture-Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (visited Nov. 10, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/goods/spsagr.htm> [hereinafter SPS
Agreement].
i0 The WTO Agreement is the agreement establishing the WTO. See Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
SPS Agreement, supra note 9, preamble.
Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WTO Doc. WT/DS I8/R (report of the
panel), available in WTO Dispute Settlement, Panel and Appellate Body Reports (June 12, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/18r00.doc> [hereinafter Initial Panel Report].
3 Chronology of Events, supra note 8.
4 Id.
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panel decisions,15 affirmed the panel's decision in part, finding that
Australia's import ban violated the SPS Agreement because it was not based
on a proper risk assessment.' 6 The Appellate Body also found that the ban
violated the SPS Agreement because it did not apply to the import of other
kinds of fish that present a similar or greater risk of disease.'
7
Australia conducted a new Import Risk Analysis ("IRA") 8 to address
the Appellate Body's finding that its previous risk analysis violated the SPS
Agreement.19 Australia lifted the import ban as a result of the new IRA.20
Even though Australia ended its prohibition on salmon imports, Canada
asked the WTO to find that the new guidelines violate the SPS Agreement
and do not comply with the Appellate Body report.2' With the exception of
just one provision, the WTO dispute settlement panel 22 concluded that
Australia's new import guidelines are consistent with the SPS Agreement.
23
This Comment examines the salmon dispute and discusses the
implications of the WTO dispute settlement panel's decision to uphold most
24
of Australia's new guidelines. Part II provides an overview of GATT and
'5 Parties to a dispute are given the right to appeal the decision of a dispute settlement panel. Three
members of the seven-person Appellate Body hear an appeal. GUIDE, supra note 7, at 22.
16 Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon 123-24, WTO Doc. WT/DSI8/AB/R
(report of the Appellate Body), available in WTO Dispute Settlement, Panel and Appellate Body Reports
(Oct. 20, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/ds 18abr.pdf> [hereinafter Appellate Body Report].
"7 Id. at 110-11.
1s The Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service ("AQIS") import risk analysis process provides
for thorough consideration of scientific information relevant to an evaluation of quarantine risk. In cases of
unusual complexity or risk, AQIS makes arrangements for more detailed consultation with independent
scientists. Australian Quarantine & Inspection Service, Animal Quarantine Policy Memorandum 1999/26,
Australia's Appropriate Level of Protection and AQIS's Import Risk Analysis (IRA) Process (Apr. 22,
1999) <http://www.aqis.gov.au/docs/anpolicy/a99-26.htm>.
19 Australian Quarantine & Inspection Service, Animal Quarantine Policy Memorandum 1999/51,
Final Reports of Import Risk Analyses on Non-viable Salmonid Products, Non-viable Marine Finfish
Products and Live Ornamental Finfish and Adoption of New Policies (July 19, 1999)
<http://www.aqis.gov.au/docs/anpolicy/l 999-51 .doc> [hereinafter AQPM 1999/51].
20 Id.
21 Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon-Request by Canada for Determination of
Consistency of Implementation Measures, WTO Doc. WT/DS18/14 (Aug. 3, 1999), available in WTO
Document Dissemination Facility, WT/DS18/14 <http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.htm> [hereinafter
Request by Canada].
22 Canada's request for a ruling on whether Australia's new import guidelines are consistent with the
SPS Agreement is being handled by the same dispute settlement panel that decided the original case. Id. at
21. 23 See Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon-Recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada,
para. 8.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS 18/RW (report of the panel), available in WTO Dispute Settlement, Panel and
Appellate Body Reports (Feb. 18, 2000) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/200da.pdf> [hereinafter Panel
Report]. In addition to reviewing Australia's new salmonid import guidelines, the dispute settlement panel
reviewed restrictive import measures adopted by Tasmania (one of Australia's regional governments). Id.
para. 2.32.
24 This Comment does not discuss the panel's conclusion that Australia, by means of a measure
enacted by Tasmania, violated the SPS Agreement. Id. para. 8.1.
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the WTO, including the WTO dispute resolution system. Part III describes
the procedural history of this case, including the panel and Appellate Body
reports on Australia's import ban. Part IV outlines Australia's new fish
import guidelines and Canada's challenges to the new guidelines. Part V
reviews the dispute settlement panel report on the new guidelines. Part VI
evaluates the new guidelines in light of other WTO cases that involve the
SPS Agreement and argues that the panel's decision is evidence that the SPS
Agreement can be used to protect the human health interests of WTO
members.
II. BACKGROUND: THE WTO, GATT, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Brief Overview of the WTO and GATT
Australia and Canada are both members of the WTO, an organization
that provides the institutional and legal foundation for a multinational
25trading system. The WTO's stated objectives include expanding
production and trade throughout the world, raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment, and protecting the environment.26 Prior to the
establishment of the WTO, world trade matters were handled through the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 ("GATT 1947"),27 an
agreement that defined the rules for the trade of goods by GATT members.28
Many countries came to believe that GATT 1947 and its dispute resolution
process did not function effectively, and thus had to be reformed. 29 The
1994 Uruguay Round negotiations 30 to reform GATT 1947 established the
WTO, which replaced GATT 1947 as the basis for institutional cooperation
and dispute settlement on trade matters among its members. 3t The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT 1994',)32 adopted the basic
set of trade rules set forth in GATT 1947.33 GATT 1994 is an annex to the
25 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 3.
26 WTO Agreement, supra note 10, preamble, para. 1.
27 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
28 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 38.
29 Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1195,
1199 (1998).
30 GATT is based on tariff concessions that are set during multilateral trade negotiations (rounds).
See John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes, Introduction and Overview, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY
ROUND 1, 3 (John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997).
" GUIDE, supra note 7, at 1-2, 38.
32 Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 10,
Annex IA [hereinafter GATT 1994].
33 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 38.
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WTO Agreement which, in conjunction with the other agreements in Annex
1A of the WTO Agreement, describes the goods-related obligations of WTO
members.34
B. Dispute Resolution Under GA TT 1947
Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947 established the initial dispute
resolution process for member countries. 35  Article XXII granted GATT
member countries the right to "consult" with each other.36  Under Article
XXIII, a member that felt it had been denied the benefits of GATT by
another member could exercise this right to consultation.37 The purpose of
these provisions was to encourage the parties to a dispute to seek a mutually
satisfactory resolution without outside interference. 38 If the consultations
were unsuccessful, a panel could convene to review the submissions of
interested parties, hear oral arguments, and rule on a dispute.39  A panel
consisted of either three or five independent experts who were usually
delegates of countries not involved in the dispute.40  After making its
decision, the panel submitted its ruling to the parties to encourage further
settlement negotiations.41  The panel's recommendation became binding
only when adopted by the GATT Council.42 The GATT Council was
composed of representatives from all of the GATT member countries.4 3
Many countries believed that the GATT 1947 dispute resolution
process was ineffective.44 Under GATT 1947 the party against whom a
complaint was filed could make use of several procedures to block dispute
34 Id.
" id. at 18.36 Article XXII of GATT 1947 is the same as Article XXII of GATT 1994. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text. Article XXII provides:
(1) Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate
opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by another
contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
(2) The contracting parties may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with any
contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a
satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1.
GATT 1994, supra note 32, art. XXII.
37 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 18.
38 Lichtenbaum, supra note 29, at 1198-99.
39 Id. at 1199.
40 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 18-19.
4' Lichtenbaum, supra note 29.
42 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 19.
43 Lichtenbaum, supra note 29.
44 id.
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resolution efforts.45 For example, until reforms in 1989, a party to a dispute
had the power to prevent the establishment of a panel.46 Even after a party
agreed to establish a panel, the party could delay setting the panel's terms of
reference47 and choosing the panel members.48 In addition, a single party
could block the GATT Council's adoption of a panel report.49 Even when
the GATT Council adopted a panel report, GATT provided no mechanism to
force the offending party to alter measures found inconsistent with its GATT
obligations or to provide compensation to injured parties.50  Further, the
GATT Council did not always authorize the injured party to retaliate against
the offending party.5'
C. The WTO Dispute Settlement System
The ineffectiveness of the dispute resolution system was a major
factor in the decision of GATT members to modify GATT 1947.52 Thus,
dispute resolution was a main topic of discussion at the Uruguay Round
negotiations to reform GATT 1947." The Uruguay Round agreement
established the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") 54 that overhauled the GATT 1947 dispute
resolution system.55 Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947 were
incorporated without change as part of GATT 1994, but now form only part
56of the WTO dispute settlement system. The WTO dispute settlement
57
system includes dispute settlement panels as well as an appellate process.
45 id.
46 id.
47 The panel's "terms of reference" refer to the issues before the panel as determined by the
complaining member's request for panel formation. Id. at 1225.
48 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 19&
49 Lichtenbaum, supra note 29.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 19.
53 Lichtenbaum, supra note 29, at 1200.
4 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, supra note 10, Annex 2; 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
55 Id.
56 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 18.
" Id. at 21-22.
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1. The Dispute Settlement Panel
Under the current WTO dispute settlement system, panels of three or
five independent experts settle trade disputes between member countries. 58
However, before a dispute settlement panel is established, a complaining
party must request consultations with the offending party. 59 If the offending
party does not respond to a request for consultations within ten days or the
consultations have not succeeded after sixty days, the complaining member
may ask the WTO General Council, 6° acting as the Dispute Settlement
Body, 61 to establish a panel.62  After the panel is established, it receives
written submissions from the parties and hears oral arguments.63 The panel
then submits its conclusions in an interim report that can be reviewed by the
parties. 64 The final report is submitted to the parties and circulated to all
WTO members.65 The Dispute Settlement Body automatically adopts the
panel report within sixty days unless a party appeals or there is consensus
not to adopt it.
66
The current WTO dispute settlement system is more efficient than the
GATT 1947 system. A complaining party can now establish a panel, obtain
a ruling from the panel, and obtain authority to retaliate 67 without the
consent of the defending party.68  In addition, the WTO system provides
strict deadlines for the completion of each phase of the dispute resolution
process. A normal case should not take more than one year to resolve
although if appealed it may take up to fifteen months. 69
" Id. at 21.
'9 Id. at 27.
60 The WTO General Council consists of representatives from all WTO member countries. WTO
Agreement, supra note 10, art. IV(2).
61 The WTO General Council, when acting as the Dispute Settlement Body, has the sole authority to
"establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, (and] maintain surveillance of implementation
of rulings and recommendations." Id. Annex 2, art. 2.1; see also GUIDE, supra note 7, at 20.
62 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 27.
63 Lichtenbaum, supra note 29, at 1201.
64Id.
65 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 28.
66 Id.
67 Retaliation is a remedy available to a complaining country that prevails in the dispute settlement
process. See generally id. at 23. Retaliation involves suspending tariff concessions such that the
complaining country can impose substantial penalties on the import of goods from the offending country.
Id.
68 Lichtenbaum, supra note 29, at 1201.
69 id.
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2. The Appellate Body
Under the DSU, parties to a dispute have the right to appeal a panel
decision to the Appellate Body. 70 The Appellate Body is appointed by the
Dispute Settlement Body and consists of "persons of recognized authority,
with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter
of the covered agreements.",7' An appeal from a panel decision is heard by
three of the seven members of the Apellate Body.72 Generally, appellate
proceedings take less than ninety days.
The issue of whether Appellate Body decisions are binding on
subsequent panels has not yet been resolved.74 However, the Appellate
Body decision in United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India75 provides insight into this issue. In Wool
Shirts, the Appellate Body stated that the DSU was not "meant to encourage
either panels or the Appellate Body to 'make law' by clarifying existing
provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a
particular dispute. 7 6 This statement suggests that the Appellate Body would
not hold that its decisions are binding. Even so, the issue of whether
Appellate Body decisions are binding is largely academic as most dispute
settlement panels are strongly motivated to act consistently with prior
Appellate Body decisions in order to avoid being reversed.78 In fact, dispute
resolution panels and the Appellate Body frequently cite previous Appellate
Body reports as authority for their decisions.79
70 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 22.
71 Id; see also DSU, supra note 54, art. 17.14.
72 Lichtenbaum, supra note 29, at 1202.
73 GUIDE, supra note 7, at 28.
74 Lichtenbaum, supra note 29, at 1247.
75 United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WTO
Doc. WT/DS331AB/R (report of the Appellate Body), available in WTO Dispute Settlement, Panel and
Appellate Body Reports (Apr. 25 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/wlshirab.wp5> [hereinafter Wool
Shirts) Lichtenbaum, supra note 29, at 1247.
"7 Id.
71 Id. at 1248.
79 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, supra note 16; Initial Panel Report, supra note 12.
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III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIA-CANADA SALMON DISPUTE
Canada is particularly sensitive to import restrictions because over
forty percent of all goods produced in Canada are exported.80 Revenues
from the export of fish products totaled 2.2 billion Canadian dollars
(approximately 1.5 billon United States dollars) from January to October
1999.81 Canadian salmon is exported to nearly fifty countries around the
world.82 Thus, it is not surprising that since 1975, when Australia prohibited
salmon imports, Canada has made numerous attempts to eliminate the
prohibition. 83  In 1995, after two decades of efforts to resolve its dispute
with Australia, Canada requested consultations with Australia under Article
4 of the DSU.84  During the consultations, Australia agreed to conduct an
Import Risk Analysis of wild Pacific salmon imports. 85  In May 1995,
Australia issued a draft IRA ("1995 Draft IRA") concluding that headless,
eviscerated Pacific salmon from Canada and the United States were safe
enough to be imported and that the import ban should be lifted.86 However,
this recommendation encountered strong domestic opposition in Australia,
especially from Tasmanian salmon cultivators and sport fishing groups.87
These groups argued that the salmon imports presented too great a risk of
disease to Australian fisheries and that the Australian government might be
liable for hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation if diseases were
introduced by the imports.88 As a result of this domestic pressure, Australia
reversed course and released a "final" IRA in December 1996 ("1996 Final
go Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade ("DFAIT"), Trade Negotiations and
Agreements: Why Trade Matters? (visited Jan. 29, 2000) <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/text-
e.asp>.
s See Industry Canada, Trade Data Online (visited Jan. 29, 2000) <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/cgi-
bin/tdst-bin/wow/wow.codeContrySelectionPage>.
82 Government Seeks Input on Possible Retaliation Against Australia, available in DFAIT News
Release (May 28, 1999) <http://198.103.104.118/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/MinPubDocs/
100355.htm> [hereinafter News Release].
83 id.
84 Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WTO Doc. WT/DS 18/2 (request for the
establishment of a panel by Canada), available in WTO Document Dissemination Facility (Mar. 10, 1997)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html>.8' See generally News Release, supra note 82.
86 1995 Draft IRA, supra note 2, executive summary.
87 News Release, supra note 82.
88 Australian Fishing Groups Vow to Fight on Against Salmon Decision, AAP NEWS, Aug. 4, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 21586751.
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IRA").8 9  The 1996 Final IRA concluded that the import ban should be
maintained. 90
In March 1997, Canada called for the establishment of a WTO dispute
settlement panel to review Australia's import ban.91 Canada argued that the
import ban violated the SPS Agreement. 92  The panel issued its report in
June 1998, in which it ruled against Australia on three grounds. 93 First, the
panel concluded that Australia, by maintaining an import ban that was not
based on a risk assessment, had acted inconsistently with Articles 5.1 and
2.294 of the SPS Agreement. 95  Second, it concluded that Australia had
violated Articles 5.5 and 2.396 of the SPS Agreement because the import ban
on salmon was arbitrary or unjustifiable when considered in light of the
treatment of other imported fish products. 97 As an example, the panel noted
that while wild, ocean-caught Pacific salmon products were banned, whole
frozen herring and live ornamental finfish 98 were not banned. 99 Finally, the
panel concluded that Australia had violated Article 5.6100 of the SPS
Agreement by maintaining an import ban that was more trade restrictive than
necessary to achieve an appropriate level of sanitary protection.' 0' In July
1998, Australia appealed the panel's decision to the Appellate Body.'
0 2
In its review of the dispute settlement panel's decision, the Appellate
Body agreed that the import ban violated Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS
89 News Release, supra note 82; see also Australian Quarantine & Inspection Service, Salmon
Import Risk Analysis, executive summary (Dec. 13, 1996) <http://www.aqis.gov.au/docs/anpolicy/
salmon.htni> [hereinafter 1996 Final IRA].
90 Id.
91 Chronology of Events, supra note 8.
92 Overview, supra note 9.
93 Initial Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 9.1.
94 Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement require sanitary or phytosanitary measures to be based
on an appropriate assessment of potential risks and on sufficient scientific evidence. SPS Agreement,
supra note 9, arts. 5.1, 2.2; see infra Part V.A.
95 Initial Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 9.1.
96 Articles 5.5 and 2.3 of the SPS Agreement prohibit WTO members from adopting sanitary
measures that arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between import products or member countries such
that the sanitary measure amounts to a disguised restriction on international trade. SPS Agreement, supra
note 9, arts. 5.5, 2.3; see infra Part V.B.
97 Initial Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 9.1.
98 Live ornamental finfish are decorative or aquarium fish and are not for human consumption. See
Australian Quarantine & Inspection Service, Import Risk Analysis on Live Ornamental Finfish 2 (visited
Jan. 15, 2000) <http://www.aqis.gov.au/docs/qdu/finalomamental.pdf> [hereinafter 1999 Ornamental IRA].
99 Initial Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 9.1.
1w Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement requires WTO members to ensure that their sanitary or
phytosanitary measures are not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve their appropriate level of
sanitary protection. SPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 5.6; see infra Part III.C.
'0' Initial Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 9.1.
02 Chronology of Events, supra note 8.
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Agreement because it was not based on a proper risk assessment. 10 3 The
Appellate Body also agreed that the import ban violated Articles 5.5 and 2.3
of the SPS Agreement because it arbitrarily imposed different levels of
sanitary protection for different import products and was a disguised
restriction on international trade.' °4 However, the Appellate Body reversed
the dispute settlement panel's conclusion that the import ban was more trade
restrictive than necessary under Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.
0 5
Australia performed a new IRA to address the Appellate Body's
conclusion that its previous risk analysis violated the SPS Agreement.'0 6 In
July of 1999, Australia released a memorandum that detailed the results of
the new IRA and announced new import guidelines.' 07  Under the new
guidelines, salmon products may be imported into Australia, provided that
they meet several quarantine conditions.' 0 8 The new import guidelines also
impose stricter conditions on the importation of other kinds of fish. 109
Despite the relaxation of Australia's restrictions on the import of salmon,
Canada asked the WTO to find that the new guidelines violate the SPS
Agreement and do not comply with the Appellate Body report."0  The
dispute settlement panel concluded that Australia's new import guidelines,
with the exception of only one provision, are consistent with the SPS
Agreement."' Australia's revised import guidelines are detailed in Part IV
of this comment. The decision of the dispute settlement panel is discussed
in Part V.
IV. AUSTRALIA'S REVISED IMPORT GUIDELINES
Following the Appellate Body decision in October of 1998, a WTO
arbitrator 1 2 gave Australia until July of 1999 to modify its import
103 Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, at 80.
"4 Id. at 93.
'o' Id. at 97.
'06 AQPM 1999/51, supra note 19.
107 Id.
10s Australian Quarantine & Inspection Service, Revised Fish Import Guidelines Announced,
attachment A, The AQIS Import Risk Analyses Policies (media release) (July 19, 1999)
<http://www.aqis.gov.au/docs/pr/salmonattacha.htm> [hereinafter Revised Fish Import Guidelines]; see
infra Part IV.
109 Revised Fish Import Guidelines, supra note 108.
110 Request by Canada, supra note 21.
1 Panel Report, supra note 23, para. 8.1.
112 When the Dispute Settlement Body adopts a panel or Appellate Body report, the losing party must
comply with the report within "a reasonable period of time." DSU, supra note 54, art. 21(3). This
"reasonable period of time" can be determined by an arbitrator. Id. art. 21(3)(c).
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restrictions to make them consistent with the SPS Agreement.'" 3  In early
1999, Australia conducted a new Import Risk Analysis for salmonids, non-
salmonid marine finfish, and live ornamental finfish ("1999 IRA"). 114 Based
on this IRA, Australia announced new import guidelines in a July 19, 1999
memorandum. 15  Canada challenged the new guidelines in the WTO,
arguing that they do not comply with the Appellate Body report and that
they still violate the SPS Agreement."
6
A. The Revised Import Guidelines for Salmonids
The new guidelines end the ban on imports of salmonid products into
Australia."t 7 Australia now allows the import of salmonid products that are
accompanied by both an import permit and an official certificate issued by a
competent authority" l8 of the exporting country. 119 Each application for an
import permit must identify (1) the salmonid species, (2) the country of
export, (3) the country of origin of the salmonid fish (if not exported directly
from the country of origin), and (4) the product's form. 20  The official
certificate must indicate that the imported salmonid product meets nine
criteria. 12 1 Among these criteria, the fish must be processed, inspected, and
graded by a competent authority, and the fish products must be free of
lesions. 122 Salmonid product accompanied by both an import permit and an
113 See Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon-Award of the Arbitrator, WTO Doc.
WT/DS18/9 (Feb. 23, 1999), available in WTO Dispute Settlement, Panel and Appellate Body Reports
<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/18-9.pdf>.
14 See 1999 Ornamental IRA, supra note 98, at 2.
.. AQPM 1999/51, supra note 19.
116 Request by Canada, supra note 21.
117 See AQPM 1999/5 1, supra note 19.
Is A competent authority is an agency within the exporting country that oversees or regulates the
export of animal products. For example, the United States Food and Drug Administration and the National
Marine Fisheries Service are competent authorities. See generally 1999 IRA, supra note 1, app. 2.
119 Australian Quarantine & Inspection Service, Animal Quarantine Policy Memorandum 1999/69,
Importation of Uncanned Salmonid Product (Oct. 20, 1999) <http://www.aqis.gov.au/docs/anpolicy/l999-
69.doc> [hereinafter AQPM 1999/69].
120 Id. attachment 1, § 2.2.
121 The nine criteria are: (1) the fish were derived from a population for which there is a documented
system of health surveillance and monitoring administered by a competent authority; (2) the fish were not
derived from a population slaughtered as an official disease control measure; (3) the fish have been
eviscerated; (4) the head and gills have been removed and internal and external surfaces thoroughly
washed; (5) the fish are not juvenile salmonids or sexually mature adults/spawners; (6) the fish were
processed in premises under the control of a competent authority; (7) the fish were subjected to an
inspection and grading system supervised by a competent authority; (8) for Atlantic salmon, the fish for
export to Australia did not come from a farm known or officially suspected of being affected by an
outbreak of infectious salmon anemia; and (9) the product is free from visible lesions associated with
infectious disease and is fit for human consumption. Id. attachment 1, § 2.4.
122 Id.
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official certificate will be released from quarantine if it is in consumer-
ready 123 form. 1
24
B. The Revised Import Guidelines for Non-Salmonid Marine Finfish
Australia's new guidelines also change the requirements for the
import of non-salmonid marine finfish. Under the guidelines, four
categories of non-salmonid marine finfish may be imported. These include
(1) consumer-ready product, (2) all fish product from New Zealand, (3)
headless, eviscerated fish that are not consumer-ready, and (4) product that
does not fit in the first three categories including whole, round
(uneviscerated) fish and head-on eviscerated product.' 25
Under the first category, Australia does not require either an official
health certificate or an import permit for non-salmonid fish product that has
been processed to a consumer-ready state. 26 For non-salmonid product, the
requirements for "consumer readiness" are the same as those for salmonid
product.
27
The second category of fish imports that Australia will allow is non-
salmonid finfish product from New Zealand. 128  Non-salmonid finfish
product may be imported and released from quarantine when accompanied
by a certificate of origin from the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry. 129 The certificate of origin must indicate that the fish were caught
in New Zealand's exclusive economic zone or in adjacent international
waters.
30
Under the third category, Australia will permit headless, eviscerated
non-salmonid finfish to be imported and ,released from quarantine if an
official health certificate from a competent authority of the exporting
country accompanies them.'31 An import permit is not required for headless,
123 Consumer-ready product is product that is ready to be cooked or consumed, including (1) cutlets
of less than 450 grams, (2) skinless fillets of any weight, (3) skin-on fillets of less than 450 grams, (4)
eviscerated, headless "pan-size" fish of less than 450 grams, and (5) product that is processed further than
the stages described above. Id. attachment 1, § 1.4.
24 Id.
125 Australian Quarantine & Inspection Service, Animal Quarantine Policy Memorandum 1999/79,
Implementation of New Quarantine Guidelines for the Importation of Non-viable, Non-salmonid Marine
and Freshwater Finfish and Their Products app. 1 (Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.aqis.gov.au/docs/anpolicy/
1999-79.doc> [hereinafter AQPM 1999/79].
126 Id. app. 1, pt. A, § 2.
:27 Compare id. app. 1, pt. A, § 1.3 with APQM 1999/69, supra note 119, attachment 1, § 1.4.
28 AQPM 1999/79, supra note 125, app. 1, pt. B.
129 Id. app. 1, pt. B, § 1.3.
:30 Id. app. 1, Pt. B, § 2.2.
"3 Id. app. 1, pt. C, § 1.3.
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eviscerated non-salmonid finfish.132  The official health certificate must
attest that (1) the fish were processed at a facility approved by and under the
control of a competent authority, (2) the fish were eviscerated, (3) the fish
were subjected to an inspection system supervised by a competent authority,
(4) the head and gills were removed and internal and external surfaces
thoroughly washed, and (5) the product is free from visible lesions
associated with infectious disease.' 
33
The fourth category of non-salmonid fish imports that Australia will
allow is non-salmonid product that does not fit in one of the categories
described above.134  Generally, Australia will allow the import of non-
salmonid product, including whole, round (uneviscerated) fish and head-on
eviscerated product, if both an import permit and an official health
certificate accompany the product. 35 Each application for an import permit
must include the following details: (1) the country of export, (2) the source
of fish and confirmation that the fish, or fish from which the product is
derived, were caught in the wild, (3) identification of fish species (scientific
name and common name), (4) whether fish of other species will be present
in consignments and, if so, the species, (5) the arrangements for inspection
of product and for provision of a health certificate that meets Australia's
requirements, (6) product presentation/form, and (7) intended end-use of the
product. 36  The official certificate must indicate that the imported non-
salmonid product meets six criteria. 137  Among these the fish must be
processed, inspected, and graded by a competent authority, and the fish
products must be free of lesions. 38 If the product to be imported contains
fish named on Australia's "specified finfish species" list, 39 Australia
generally will not permit importation unless the product is head-off and
132 Id. app. 1, pt. C, § 2.1.
:33 Id. app. 1, pt. C, § 2.2.
34 Id. app. 1, pt. D, §1.1.
35 Id. app. 1, pt. D, §§ 2.2, 2.4.
136 Id. app. 1, pt. D, § 2.2.
137 The official certificate must (1) attest to the source of the fish and confirm that the fish or fish
from which the product is derived were caught in the wild, (2) identify the fish species (scientific name and
common name) in the consignment, (3) confirm that the consignment does not contain other fish species,
(4) confirm that the fish were processed in premises approved by and under the control of a competent
authority, (5) confirm that the fish were inspected under the supervision of a competent authority, and (6)
confirm that the product is free from visible lesions associated with infectious disease. Id. app. 1, pt. D, §
2.4.
135 Id.
139 The fish on the "specified finfish species" list are susceptible species that have a higher risk of
disease and thus are subject to sanitary measures. See, e.g., 1999 IRA, supra note 1, at 208. The list as of
November 1999 can be found in AQPM 1999/79, supra note 125, app. 1, pt. D, § 1.10.
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eviscerated, is further processed, 140 or is intended for further processing at
designated premises in Australia.1
4
'
C. The Revised Import Guidelines for Live Ornamental Finfish
Australia's revised guidelines continue to permit the import of live
ornamental finfish into Australia, provided that they are accompanied by (1)
an animal health certificate from a competent authority attesting to the health
of the fish in the consignment and the health status of the premises of export,
(2) certification from a competent authority that the premises of export are
currently approved for export to Australia, and (3) certification from a
competent authority that the fish had not shared water with food-fish
aquaculture premises. 42  Each import is subject to post-arrival quarantine
detention in approved private facilities under quality assurance arrangements
approved by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service. 143  In
addition to the certification requirements, eight risk management measures
may be applied to address specific disease concerns' 44 including health
certification, testing of source populations for disease, pre-export inspection
of the fish, testing of imports for disease, and treatment of diseased fish.
14 5
In summary, Australia's revised guidelines end the ban on the import
of salmonid products. 46  They also set forth more stringent criteria for the
import of non-salmonid finfish products and live ornamental finfish.147 Thus
the revised guidelines narrow the difference that previously existed between
the import criteria for non-salmonid products and salmonid products.
140 For example, thorough cooking such as canning, hot smoking, and pasteurization constitutes
further processing that substantially inactivates pathogens. 1999 IRA, supra note 1, at 22.
14' AQPM 1999/79, supra note 125, app. 1, pt. D, § 1.3.
142 AQPM 1999/51, supra note 19, attachment 3.
143 Id.
144 The eight risk management measures are as follows: (1) health certification from the competent
authority that the source of the fish was free of specified disease agents; (2) testing of the source population
of the fish for specified disease agents; (3) pre-export visual inspection; (4) visual inspection at the border
to identify overtly diseased consignments and to ensure that the fish are a permitted species; (5) quarantine
security over procedures in quarantine premises, including the disposal of sick and dead fish, transport
water, packaging materials, and other waste; (6) testing of imported fish, on a random or routine basis, to
address the likelihood that unwanted disease agents may be present in a consignment, and/or to provide
additional data to improve targeting of risk management measures generally; (7) if the presence of specific
disease agents is suspected or confirmed by diagnostic testing, appropriate treatment of imported fish; and
(8) increased post-arrival quarantine over the minimum indicated period. Id.
145 Id.
146 See id. attachment I.
41 See AQPM 1999/79, supra note 125; AQPM 1999/51, supra note 19, attachment 3; Panel Report,
supra note 23, para. 7.91.
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D. Canada Challenges Australia's Revised Import Guidelines
Even though the new guidelines eliminated the twenty-five year old
ban on the import of salmonids into Australia, Canada challenged the
measures by filing a request that asked the original dispute resolution panel
to determine whether Australia's new measures were consistent with the
Appellate Body report and the SPS Agreement. 148 Canada argued that the
new measures were not based on a risk assessment, were not based on
scientific principles, were applied to a greater extent than is necessary to
protect animal life or health, and were maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence contrary to Articles 5.1 and 2.2.149 Canada also argued
that the measures arbitrarily and unjustifiably discriminated between New
Zealand and Canada and between Australia and Canada, and were applied in
a manner that constituted a disguised restriction on international trade,
contrary to the first provision of Article 2.3.150 In addition, Canada
contended that when considered against the measures for non-salmonid
marine finfish products and live omamental finfish, the measures for
salmonids reflected arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in Australia's
appropriate level of protection, resulting in a disguised restriction on
international trade that violates Article 5.5.15 1 Further, Canada claimed that
the new guidelines for salmonids entailed more informational requirements
and were more trade restrictive than required to achieve Australia's
appropriate level of sanitary protection, contrary to Articles 5.6 and 8 and
Annex C.l(c).152  The dispute settlement panel issued its decision in
February 2000.153
V. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PANEL REPORT
In its report, the WTO dispute settlement panel upheld most of
Australia's new import guidelines. The panel concluded that Australia's
1999 IRA was a proper risk assessment.'5 4 In addition, the panel determined
that the guidelines for salmon, when compared to those for other fish, do not
result in disguised restrictions on trade, and that the new guidelines do not
148 Request by Canada, supra note 21.
49 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 id.
153 See Panel Report, supra note 23.
54 Id. para. 7.71.
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impose unnecessary informational requirements. 155  Even so, the dispute
settlement panel found that the new guidelines violated several articles of the
SPS Agreement.156  However, these violations were based solely on the
consumer-ready provision of the salmon import guidelines.157 The panel did
not find that other provisions violated the SPS Agreement.
58
A. Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement
Canada argued that Australia's new import guidelines violated Article
5.1159 of the SPS Agreement. 60  Article 5.1 requires that any sanitary
measure that constitutes a trade restriction be based on a proper assessment
of the risk posed by the product.' 6' The dispute settlement panel first
addressed whether Australia's 1999 IRA constituted a proper risk
assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1.162 A risk assessment is an
"evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or
disease within the territory of an importing Member according to the
sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the
associated potential biological and economic consequences. ' 6  A risk
assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1 must:
(1) identify the diseases whose entry, establishment or spread
a Member wants to prevent within its territory, as well as
the potential biological and economic consequences
associated with the entry, establishment or spread of
these diseases;
(2) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread
of these diseases, as well as the associated potential
biological and economic consequences; and
Id. paras. 7.102-03, 7.107, 7.154-57.
116 Id. para. 8.1.
157 Id.; see also infra Part V.A, C.
158 Panel Report, supra note 23, para 8.1.
139 Article 5.1 provides that "Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are
based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or
health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations." SPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 5.1.
160 Request by Canada, supra note 21.
161 SPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 5.1.
162 Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, at 70.
163 Id. at 72 (citing SPS Agreement, supra note 9, Annex A, para. 4).
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(3) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread
of these diseases according to the SPS measures which
might be applied.164
The dispute settlement panel applied this test to Australia's 1999 IRA. 165
The panel concluded that all three requirements were met and that the 1999
IRA therefore constituted a proper risk assessment within the meaning of
Article 5.1.
In its decision, the dispute settlement panel noted that Canada did not
contest the first requirement; only the second and third requirements were at
issue. 66  The panel determined that the 1999 IRA met the second
requirement because it objectively evaluated the likelihood of entry,
establishment, or spread of the identified diseases, and it did so based on
sufficient scientific evidence. 167 The panel contrasted the 1999 IRA with the
1996 Final IRA, the study on which Australia's original salmon import ban
was based. 68  The panel observed that whereas the 1996 Final IRA
evaluated only the "possibility-instead of likelihood or probability of
disease entry, establishment, or spread,"169 the 1999 IRA qualitatively
determined "the probability of the disease entering and becoming established
in Australia through imports of eviscerated salmonids."'' 70  The panel also
noted that for each disease, the 1999 IRA qualitatively determined the
expected impact of disease establishment.' 71 The panel further observed that
the 1999 IRA determined for each disease whether the risk of disease
establishment and impact was acceptable in light of Australia's appropriate
level of protection against disease. 112
The dispute settlement panel also determined that the 1999 IRA met
the third requirement of an appropriate risk assessment under Article 5.1
because the IRA substantively evaluated how the sanitary measures that
might be applied would affect the likelihood of entry, establishment, or
spread of disease. 73 Again, the panel contrasted the 1999 IRA with the
1996 Final IRA. The panel noted that whereas the 1996 Final IRA did not
evaluate the effectiveness of the import ban in reducing overall disease
164 Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, at 73 (emphasis in original).
165 Panel Report, supra note 23, para. 7.41.
166 Id. para. 7.42.
167 Id. paras. 7.52-55.
68 Id. para. 7.45 n.167.
69 Id. para. 7.45 (emphasis in original).
70 Id. para. 7.54.
171 Id.
:72 Id. para. 7.55.
73 Id. para. 7.71.
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risk, 74 the 1999 IRA substantively examined potential sanitary measures. 75
Specifically, the 1999 IRA identified several available sanitary measures for
each disease and discussed the effect that each measure would have on
disease establishment and the consequences that would flow from such
disease establishment. 76 In short, the panel found that the 1999 IRA met all
three requirements of a proper risk assessment.
The dispute settlement body next considered whether Australia's new
import guidelines were based on the 1999 IRA.177 A sanitary measure is
"based on" a risk assessment when there is "a rational relationship between
the measure and the risk assessment."' 7 8 Canada alleged that there was no
rational relationship between the 1999 IRA and the requirement that
salmonid imports must be consumer-ready before they are released from
quarantine. 79 The dispute settlement panel agreed with Canada, observing
that the new guidelines provided no explanation of why the "consumer-
ready" requirement was necessary.180 In light of the 1999 IRA's conclusion
that head and gill removal and thorough washing significantly reduces
disease risk, the panel could find no rational relationship between the 1999
IRA and the additional requirement.' 81 Thus the panel concluded that
Australia's new import guidelines, to the extent that they required salmonid
imports to be consumer-ready, violated Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.' 
82
Based on the violation of Article 5.1, the dispute settlement panel
concluded that the consumer-ready requirement violated Article 2.2183 of the
SPS Agreement.184 The Appellate Body in the original dispute explained the
relationship between Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement:
'74 Id. para. 7.60 (citing Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, at 76).
175 Panel Report, supra note 23, para. 7.66.
176 Id.
177 Id. paras. 7.72-74.
178 Id. (citing European Communio,-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO
Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R para. 193 (report of the Appellate Body), available in WTO Dispute Settlement, Panel
and Appellate Body Reports (Feb. 13, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/hormab.pdf> [hereinafter
Hormones]).
179 Panel Report, supra note 23, para. 7.78.
'8o Id. paras. 7.82-83.
181 Id. paras. 7.80, 7.83.
82 Id. para. 7.84.
183 Article 2 describes Basic Rights and Obligations under the SPS Agreement. Article 2.2 of the SPS
Agreement provides, "Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to
the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is
not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5."
SPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 2.2.
4 Panel Report, supra note 23, para. 7.85.
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Articles 5.1 and 5.2 . . . "may be seen to be marking out and
elaborating a particular route leading to the same destination set
out in" Article 2.2. Indeed, in the event a sanitary measure is
not based on a risk assessment as required in Articles 5.1 and
5.2, this measure can be presumed, more generally, not to be
based on scientific principles or to be maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence. We conclude, therefore, that if
we find a violation of the more specific Article 5.1 or 5.2 such
finding can be presumed to imply a violation of the more
general provisions of Article 2.2.185
In summary, the dispute settlement panel concluded that the 1999 IRA
met the three requirements of a risk assessment under Article 5.1 of the SPS
Agreement because it evaluated the probability of disease entry,
establishment, or spread, as well as how the potential sanitary measures
would affect those probabilities. 186  Even so, the dispute settlement panel
concluded that the new guidelines violated Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS
Agreement, but only to the extent that the consumer-ready provision was not
based on the 1999 IRA. 87
B. Articles 5.5 and 2.3 of the SPS Agreement
The dispute settlement panel next addressed whether Australia's
enactment of the new import guidelines violated Article 5.5188 of the SPS
Agreement. Article 5.5 prohibits WTO members from adopting sanitary
measures that arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between import
products or member countries such that the sanitary measures amount to
185 Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, at 80 (citing Initial Panel Report, supra note 12, para.
8.52).
186 Panel Report, supra note 23, paras. 7.63-66, 7.84.
7 Id. para. 7.84.[s Article 5.5 provides:
With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the concept of appropriate level
of sanitary or phytosanitary protection against risks to human life or health, or to animal and
plant life or health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it
considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or
a disguised restriction on international trade. Members shall cooperate in the Committee, in
accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12, to develop guidelines to further the
practical implementation of this provision. In developing the guidelines, the Committee shall
take into account all relevant factors, including the exceptional character of human health risks
to which people voluntarily expose themselves.
SPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 5.5.
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disguised restrictions on international trade.' 89  To determine whether
Australia violated Article 5.5, the dispute settlement panel applied the test
set forth by the Appellate Body in European Community-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones).190 Under Hormones,
three elements are required in order for a member to act inconsistently with
Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement: (1) distinctions must exist in appropriate
levels of protection in different situations; (2) the distinctions in levels of
protection must be arbitrary or unjustifiable; and (3) the arbitrary
distinctions in levels of protection must result in discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade. 19 1 Applying this test, the dispute
settlement panel found that none of the three elements were present, and that
therefore Australia's revised import guidelines were consistent with Article
5.5 of the SPS Agreement.1
92
1. First Element-Article 5.5
The dispute settlement panel found that Canada failed to establish the
first element of an Article 5.5 violation because under the new import
guidelines, the appropriate level of protection' 93 for the import of salmonids
did not substantially differ from that of other, similar fish products. 94 The
first element of an Article 5.5 violation is the existence of distinctions in
.ppropriate levels of protection in different situations. 195 Different situations
cannot be compared unless they present some common element that makes
them comparable.' 96 For example, different situations are comparable where
they both involve a risk of entry, establishment, or spread of the same or a
similar disease, or where they both involve similar associated biological and
economic consequences. 197  In this case, the dispute settlement panel
determined, and Australia did not contest, that the import guidelines for
189 Id.
:90 Panel Report, supra note 23, para. 7.86; see Hormones, supra note 178.
1 Hormones, supra note 178, para. 214.
92 Panel Report, supra note 23, paras. 7.89, 7.108.
93 In the 1999 IRA, Australia determined the appropriate level of protection for each species of fish
based upon two criteria: (1) the probability of a disease becoming established in the Australian fish
population; and (2) the consequences of disease establishment on the health of the fish population. Where
the probability of establishment is low and the consequences of establishment are not too dire, Australia's
appropriate level of protection is justified and risk management measures do not have to be implemented.
See 1999 IRA, supra note 1, at 12-13, 14 fig. 1.1; see also 1999 Ornamental IRA, supra note 98, at 11-13 &
fig. 1.1.
:94 See generally Panel Report, supra note 23, para. 7.92.
,95 Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, at 81 (citing Hormones, supra note 178, para. 214).
96 Id. at 81.
197 Initial Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 8.115.
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salmon and those for other fish constituted "different situations" which
could be compared 198 under Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement. 99
With respect to "distinctions in appropriate levels of protection, 2 °°
the panel noted that two of its experts believed Australia's treatment of
salmonid and non-salmonid imports reflected the same or similar levels of
protection. 20' The panel also observed that when compared to Australia's
previous import guidelines, the revised import guidelines imposed a less
trade restrictive regime for salmon imports while tightening the import
restrictions for non-salmonids. °2 According to the panel, any differences in
levels of protection under the new import guidelines were unlike the
substantial differences in levels of protection under the import ban at issue in
the original dispute.20 3 Thus, the dispute settlement panel concluded that the
first element of an Article 5.5 violation did not exist.
2. Second Element-Article 5.5
The second element of an Article 5.5 violation is established when the
distinctions in levels of protection are arbitrary or unjustifiable.204 Although
the dispute settlement panel found no substantial difference between the
levels of protection for salmonid and non-salmonid imports, the panel
concluded that any slight distinctions that did exist were not arbitrary or
unjustifiable.20 5 The panel began by noting that Canada identified with
specificity only one apparent distinction in levels of protection: the
difference between the sanitary measures required for salmonids and those
required for pilchards, a "category four' 20 6 non-salmonid.2° 7  The panel
observed that the guidelines for the import of pilchards appear less strict
than those required for the import of salmonids because the "category four"
"s The situations are comparable because disease agents that are the same as or similar to the salmon
disease agents of concern to Australia have been detected in non-salmonids. See id. para. 8.121.
19 Panel Report, supra note 23, para. 7.89.
200 The first element of an Article 5.5 violation has two prongs: "distinctions in appropriate levels of
protection" and "in different situations." The dispute settlement panel chose to address the "distinctions in
appropriate levels of protection" prong of the first element at the same time it addressed the second
element. Id. para. 7.89. For simplicity, this Comment discusses the "distinctions" prong in this section.
20 Id. para. 7.92.
202 Id. para. 7.91.
203 Id. para. 7.90.
204 Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, at 85.
205 Panel Report, supra note 23, para. 7.101.
206 Category four refers to non-salmonid imports that do not fit into categories one, two, or three, such
as whole, uneviscerated non-salmonid imports. See AQPM 1999/79, supra note 125, app. 1, pt. D; see also
supra Part IV.B.
207 Panel Report, supra note 23, para. 7.95.
VOL. 9 No. 2
A USTRALIA-CANADA SALMON DISPUTE
guidelines do not require measures such as evisceration. °8 However,
according to the panel, this distinction was not arbitrary or unjustifiable.20 9
The panel contrasted the new import guidelines with the import ban, noting
that the import ban imposed substantial differences in levels of protection
without justification,210 whereas any differences under the new guidelines
were properly based on the 1999 IRA. 211 Specifically, the panel pointed out
that only one of the major salmon diseases identified in the 1999 IRA was
associated with pilchards and that there was no evidence of transmission of
that disease from pilchards to salmonids.1 2 In addition, the panel observed
that the consequences of disease establishment were not significant.21 '3 In
short, the panel concluded that Canada failed to establish the second element
of an Article 5.5 violation because any differences in levels of protection
that resulted from the new guidelines were not arbitrary or unjustifiable.21 4
3. Third Element-Article 5.5
The dispute settlement panel concluded that Canada failed to establish
the third element of an Article 5.5 violation because Australia's new
guidelines did not discriminate against Canadian imports.215 The third
element of an Article 5.5 violation is established when arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions in levels of protection result in discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade.216 In the original dispute, the
Appellate Body concluded that a disguised trade restriction resulted from the
salmon import ban.217 In making its determination, the Appellate Body
relied on three "warning signals" and two "additional factors" considered
cumulatively: (1) the arbitrary or unjustifiable character of the differences in
levels of protection; 218 (2) the "rather substantial difference in levels of
protection" between salmonids, and non-salmonid marine and ornamental
finfish;219 (3) the inconsistency of the import ban with Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of
208 Id. para. 7.97 & n.209.
209 Id. para. 7.101.
210 Id. para. 7.90.
2i1 Id. para. 7.101.
212 Id. para. 7.99.
213 Id.
214 Id. para. 7.101.
2"' Id. paras. 7.102, 7.107.
216 Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, at 86.
217 Id. at 86-87.
218 Id. at 87.
219 Id. at 89 (emphasis in original).
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the SPS Agreement;220 (4) the "substantial, but unexplained change" from
the conclusion of the 1995 Draft IRA to the conclusion of the 1996 Final
IRA; 22 and (5) the absence of controls on the internal movement of salmon
products within Australia.222
In contrast, the dispute settlement panel found that Australia's new
import guidelines did not constitute a disguised restriction on international
trade.223 The panel observed that only one of the five warning signals was
224present,  and further noted that any differences in levels of sanitary
protection between salmonids and non-salmonids were neither "substantial"
nor "arbitrary or unjustifiable. 225  In addition, the panel found no
mysterious policy shift under the new guidelines, as was the case with
Australia's shift from allowing imports under the 1995 Draft IRA to banning
imports under the 1996 Final IRA.2 26 The panel did find that the consumer-
ready requirement violated Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.227
However, it determined that these violations, by themselves, did not
establish the third element of an Article 5.5 violation.228 In summary, the
dispute settlement panel found that Canada did not establish any of the three
elements of an Article 5.5 violation and concluded that Australia's new
import guidelines were consistent with Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.229
4. Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement
The dispute settlement panel concluded that Australia's new import
guidelines did not violate the first provision of Article 2.3230 of the SPS
Agreement.23' The panel determined that three elements are required to
220 id.
221 Id. at 91.
222 Id. at 92.
223 Panel Report, supra note 23, paras. 7.102, 7.107.
224 Id. para. 7.103.
225 Id.; see supra Part V.B.1-2.
226 Id. para. 7.104.
227 Id. para. 7.105.
228 id.
229 Id. para. 7.107.
230 Article 2 describes Basic Rights and Obligations under the SPS Agreement. Article 2.3 provides:
Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or
unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail,
including between their own territory and that of other Members. Sanitary and phytosanitary
measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on
international trade.
SPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 2.3; see Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, at 93.
23 Panel Report, supra note 23, para. 7.114.
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establish a violation of the first provision of Article 2.3: (1) the measure
discriminates between WTO members, (2) the discrimination is arbitrary or
unjustifiable, and (3) identical or similar conditions prevail in the territory of
members being compared.232 In light of the conclusion that the new import
guidelines were consistent with Article 5.5, the panel found that any
discrimination between salmonid and non-salmonid imports was not
"arbitrary or unjustifiable., 233  The panel, relying on "the substantial
difference in [fish] disease status," also found that "identical or similar
conditions" did not prevail between Australia and Canada. 234 On this basis,
the dispute settlement panel concluded that Australia's new import
guidelines were consistent with the first provision of Article 2.3 of the SPS
Agreement.
235
C. Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement
Article 5.6236 of the SPS Agreement requires WTO members to ensure
that their sanitary measures are not more trade restrictive than necessary to
achieve their appropriate level of sanitary protection.2 37 A measure is more
trade restrictive than necessary if there is another sanitary measure that (1)
achieves the member's appropriate level of protection, (2) is reasonably
available taking into account technical and economic feasibility, and (3) is
significantly less restrictive to trade than the SPS measure contested.238
These three elements are cumulative.239  Applying this test, the dispute
settlement panel found that Australia's new import guidelines, to the extent
232 Id. para. 7.111.
233 Id. para. 7.113.
234 Id.
... Id. para. 7.114.
236 Article 5.6 provides:
Without prejudice to paragraph 2 of Article 3, when establishing or maintaining sanitary or
phytosanitary measures to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection,
Members shall ensure that such measures are not more trade restrictive than required to achieve
their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and
economic feasibility.
SPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 5.6.
237 Id.
239 Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, pars. 95, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/AB/R (report
of the Appellate Body), available in WTO Dispute Settlement, Panel and Appellate Body Reports (Feb. 22,
1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/ditpute/542d.pdf> [hereinafter Agrictiltural Products].
239 id.
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they required salmon imports to be consumer-ready, 2 ° violated Article 5.6
of the SPS Agreement.24'
1. First Element-Article 5.6
The dispute settlement panel concluded that Canada established the
first element of an Article 5.6 violation because there are measures other
than the consumer-ready provision that could achieve Australia's
appropriate level of protection.242 The first element of an Article 5.6
violation is established when there is an alternative sanitary measure that
achieves the WTO member's appropriate level of protection. The dispute
settlement panel considered two alternatives to Australia's import
guidelines: (1) the import guidelines with without consumer-ready
requirements, and (2) the import guidelines without the 450 gram weight
maximum.
244
The dispute settlement panel first determined whether Australia's new
salmon import guidelines, without any consumer-ready requirements, would
achieve Australia's appropriate level of sanitary protection. 245 According to
Australia, the primary reason for imposing the consumer-ready requirements
was to reduce the risk of disease from the waste products of commercially
processed salmon imports.24 The panel rejected this argument, noting that
Australia's 1999 IRA states that evisceration, removal of the head and gills,
and thorough cleaning and washing significantly reduces disease risk.247
The panel also recalled that their experts248 were unable to find any
justification in the 1999 IRA for the consumer-ready requirements.
Moreover, the panel observed that even if Australia did need to prevent
further commercial processing of salmon imports to achieve their
appropriate level of protection against disease, the 450 gram weight
maximum was unnecessary. 250 The panel stated, "instead of imposing
weight limitations, Australia could restrict release from quarantine to salmon
240 See supra note 123 for the definition of"consumer-ready."
241 Panel Report, supra note 23, paras. 7.125, 7.153.
242 Id. paras. 7.144-45.
243 Agricultural Products, supra note 238.
244 See Panel Report, supra note 23, paras. 7.132, 7.141-42.
243 Id. para. 7.132.
'46 Id. para. 7.133.
247 Id. para. 7.134.
248 The dispute settlement panel consulted with three experts to help resolve scientific and technical
issues. Id. paras. 6.1-6.3.
249 Id. para. 7.135.
250 Id. paras. 7.141-42.
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product that has been individually and commercially packaged in a way that
makes it unattractive for commercial processors to further process the
product. ' 5 ' On this basis, the panel concluded that both alternatives would
achieve Australia's appropriate level of protection, and that therefore the
first element of an Article 5.6 violation was established. 2
2. Second Element-Article 5.6
The dispute settlement panel concluded that Canada established the
second element of an Article 5.6 violation because the measures identified
above were reasonably available taking into account technical and economic
feasibility.253 The panel agreed with Canada, reasoning that "since one can
assume that current Australian requirements are 'reasonably available taking
into account technical and economic feasibility,' also a regime without the
consumer-ready requirements ... would be [reasonably available]. 254 The
panel also concluded that instead of the 450 gram weight maximum, a
requirement for individual and commercial packaging of salmon imports
would be an alternative sanitary measure that was reasonably available to
Australia. 5  In support of its conclusion, the panel cited similar
requirements imposed by New Zealand.256 On this basis, the dispute
settlement panel concluded that the second element of an Article 5.6
violation was established.25 7
3. Third Element-Article 5.6
The dispute settlement panel also concluded that the third element of
an Article 5.6 violation was established because the measures identified
above are significantly less restrictive to trade than the consumer-ready
requirements of Australia's new salmonid import guidelines. 258 The panel
noted that eliminating either the 450 gram weight maximum or the
consumer-ready requirements in their entirety "would result in significantly
more salmon product being allowed for direct release from quarantine.
259
251 Id. para. 7.142.
252 Id. paras. 7.144-45.
253 Id. para. 7.146.
254 Id (emphasis in original).
255 Id. para. 7.147.
256 Id.
257 Id. pars. 7.149.
258 Id. paras. 7.150-52.
259 Id. para. 7.150.
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In addition, the panel observed that hotels, restaurants, and large families
generate considerable Australian demand for salmon that does not meet the
consumer-ready requirements. 260  From this the panel concluded, "The
increased market access that would result under the alternatives outlined
above would be significant and, in our view, warrants the search for other
measures by Australia., 261 In summary, the dispute settlement panel found
that Canada established all three elements of an Article 5.6 violation,
however its conclusion was based solely on the consumer-ready provision of
Australia's new import guidelines.
262
D. Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement
Canada alleged that Australia's new import guidelines mandated
unnecessarily strict information requirements in violation of Article 8 of the
263SPS Agreement. Article 8 requires WTO members to "observe the
provisions of Annex C in the operation of control, inspection and approval
procedures. ' '264 Paragraph 1(c) of Annex C provides:
(1)Members shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to
check and ensure the fulfillment of sanitary or phytosanitary
measures, that: ...
(c) information requirements are limited to what is necessary
for appropriate control, inspection and approval procedures,
including for approval of the use of additives or for the
establishment of tolerances for contaminants in food, beverages
or feedstuffs. 265
Canada argued that Australia's new import guidelines unnecessarily forced
an exporting country to prove that (1) imported fish are derived from a
population for which there is a documented system of health monitoring and
surveillance, (2) imported fish are not juveniles or sexually mature adults,
and (3) imported fish are not derived from a population slaughtered as an
official disease control measure. 266 The dispute settlement panel disagreed
260 Id.
261 Id. para. 7.51.
262 Id. paras. 7.125, 7.153.
263 Request by Canada, supra note 21.
264 SPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 8.
265 Id. Annex C, para. 1(c).
266 Panel Report, supra note 23, para. 7.155.
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with Canada's argument, stating that "all three Australian requirements...
are substantive sanitary measures in their own right, .... not procedures or
information requirements ...that are subject to paragraph l(c) of Annex
C.",26 7  Thus, the panel concluded that the new import guidelines were
consistent with Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement.268
In summary, the dispute settlement panel concluded that Australia's
1999 IRA was aproper risk assessment under Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement. 269 The dispute settlement panel also concluded that the
new guidelines were consistent with Articles 5.5 and 2.3 of the SPS
Agreement, finding that they did not impose arbitrary or unjustifiable
distinctions between the appropriate levels of protection for salmonids and
other fish and that they did not constitute a disguised restriction on
international trade.270 In addition, the panel concluded that the new import
guidelines were consistent with Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS
Agreement.271  Even so, the panel found that Australia's new salmonid
import guidelines violated Articles 5.1, 2.2, and 5.6.272 However these
violations were based solely on the consumer-ready provision of the new
salmonid import guidelines. In short, the panel upheld most of Australia's
new import guidelines.
VI. THE WTO DECISIONS INVOLVING THE SPS AGREEMENT: PROTECTION
OF THE HuMAN HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS OF WTO
MEMBERS
The Australia - Canada salmon dispute is one of only three SPS-
related trade conflicts settled by the WTO. 74 The other two decisions that
deal with the SPS Agreement are the European Community - Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) and Japan - Measures
Affecting Agricultural Products27 5 cases.27 6  In Hormones, the Appellate
Body concluded that the European Union ("EU") prohibition on the import
of meat derived from cattle treated with growth hormones was inconsistent
217 Id. para. 7.156.
2" Id. para. 7.157.
269 Id. para. 7.84.
270 Id. paras. 7.108, 7.114.
271 Id. para. 7.157.
272 Id. paras. 7.84-85, 7.153.
273 See supra Part V.A, C.
274 Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization
and the International Trade ofDairy Products, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 55, 64 (1999).
27S See Agricultural Products, supra note 238.
276 See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 274, at 65-67.
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with Articles 3.3277 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.278 In Agricultural
Products, the Appellate Body concluded that Japan's "varietal testing"
requirement 279 for the import of certain agricultural products violated
Articles 2.2 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. 280 Although the Appellate Body
found violations of the SPS Agreement in both decisions, it rejected several
of the violations found by the dispute settlement panels. 281 In these cases,
the Appellate Body focused primarily on the fact that the sanitary measures
at issue were not properly based on scientific evidence or a risk
assessment.28 2 Critics of the WTO have cited cases such as these in arguing
that the burden of demonstrating scientific validity under the SPS
Agreement is insurmountable.283 The dispute settlement panel in the
Australia-Canada salmon dispute demonstrated otherwise by substantially
upholding Australia's new import guidelines. When read in conjunction
with these two cases, the dispute settlement panel decision on Australia's
new salmon import guidelines provides strong evidence that the SPS
Agreement can effectively function to protect the human health interests of
WTO members.
A. The Hormones Decision
In 1989, the EU banned the import of meat from cattle treated with
284growth hormones. The United States and Canada each filed WTO
challenges to the import ban, arguing that the use of hormones for growth
promotion posed no threat to human health.285 In 1997, the dispute
277 Under Article 3.3, a WTO member may implement a sanitary measure that results in a level of
protection different from an international standard as long as the sanitary measure complies with Article 5.
See SPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 3.3; see also Hormones, supra note 178, paras. 172-73.278 Hormones, supra note 178, paras. 208-09.
279 Japan required exporting countries to test and confirm the efficacy of anti-moth quarantine
treatments for each variety of certain agricultural imports, including apples, cherries, peaches, walnuts,
apricots, pears, plums, and quince. Agricultural Products, supra note 238, paras. 1-2. This testing for each
variety meant that even when Japan had already approved, for example, the importation of red delicious
apples from the United States, the United States would be unable to export other varieties, such as Fujis,
until the efficacy of treatments was demonstrated specifically on the Fujis. Stewart & Johanson, supra note
274, at 67.
2" Agricultural Products, supra note 238, paras. 85, 114.
281 See, e.g., Hormones, supra note 178, para. 253(m); Agricultural Products, supra note 238, pars.
131.
282 See Hormones, supra note 178, paras. 208-09; see also Agricultural Products, supra note 238,
paras. 85, 113-14.
283 See Steve Charnovitz, New York Law School Center for International Law Symposium on World
Trade and the Environment, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 163, 168 (1999).
284 Stewart & Johanson, supra note 274, at 65.
25 Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization
and International Organizations: The Roles of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Plant
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settlement panel286 ruled that the EU import ban violated several articles of
the SPS Agreement.2 87 The EU appealed the conclusions of the panel, and
the Appellate Body released its report in January 1998.288 The Appellate
Body reversed several of the dispute settlement panel's findings. For
example, the Appellate Body reversed the finding that the import ban was
not "based on" international standards, and therefore violated Article 3.1290
of the SPS Agreement.291 The Appellate Body reasoned that the panel had
inappropriately construed "based on" to mean "conform with," and thus had
created a substantive requirement that all SPS measures must conform with
international standards.292 In addition, the Appellate Body reversed the
panel's finding that the import ban violated Article 5.5 of the SPS
Agreement.293 The Appellate Body concluded that the ban on most of the
hormones was not arbitrary or unjustifiable, and that the ban was not a
disguised restriction on international trade.294
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body found that the EU import ban
violated the SPS Agreement.29 Specifically, it concluded that the import
ban violated Articles 5.1 and 3.3 because the ban was not rationally based on
a risk assessment.296 The Appellate Body reasoned that all six of the
scientific reports relied upon by the EU to support the ban actually
concluded that the use of hormones for growth promotion was "safe. 297 On
this basis, the Appellate Body recommended that the EU bring its meat
import policy into compliance with the SPS Agreement.298 Those who point
to this case as evidence that the WTO will not uphold trade restrictive
measures designed to protect human health appear to disregard the facts of
the case. Specifically, the facts relied upon by the Appellate Body reveal
Protection Convention, and the International Office of Epizootics, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 27, 35-
36(1998).
286 The dispute settlement panel that heard the United States claims also heard Canada's claims.
Hormones, supra note 178, para. 1 n.2.287 Stewart & Johanson, supra note 274, at 65.
28 Id. at 66.
289 See Hormones, supra note 178, para. 253.
Article 3.1 provides, "To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as
possible, Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines
or recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and in
particular paragraph 3." SPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 3.1.
291 Hormones, supra note 178, paras. 157-58.
2 Id. paras. 162-63.
293 Id. para. 253(m).
294 Id. paras. 225, 246.
29 Id. para. 253(I).296 Id. paras. 208-09.
297 Id. para. 206.
298 Id. para. 255.
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that the EU's import ban on meat from hormone-treated cattle was not based
on a scientific analysis. The EU suggested that meat from hormone-treated
cattle was dangerous to human health. However, the studies offered by the• • 299
EU in support of this proposition reached the opposite conclusion. In
short, the Hormones decision demonstrates only that a sanitary measure that
has no rational basis in science violates the SPS Agreement.
B. The Agricultural Products Decision
Another WTO decision that addressed the obligations of WTO
members under the SPS Agreement was the Agricultural Products case.3 °°
In 1996, the United States requested that a WTO dispute settlement panel
review Ja an's approval process for the importation of agricultural
products.3 0  The panel concluded that Japan's "varietal testing"
requirements 302 violated several articles of the SPS Agreement. 30 3  Japan
appealed the panel decision and the Appellate Body released its report in
February 1999.304 The Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that the
varietal testing requirements were more trade restrictive than necessary and
thus violated Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. 30 5 The Appellate Body
reasoned that the panel inappropriately based its conclusion solely on expert
testimony because the United States had not even argued the specific
issue.30 6 Therefore, according to the Appellate Body, the dispute settlement
panel had relieved the United States of its burden of proof.30 7
Even so, the Appellate Body found that Japan's varietal testing
requirements violated the SPS Agreement. 308  Specifically, the Appellate
Body concluded that the requirements were maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence in violation of Article 2.2,309 and that the requirements
were not rationally based on a risk assessment in violation of Article 5.1 of
the SPS Agreement. 310 The Appellate Body noted that the risk assessment
relied upon by Japan "does not discuss or even refer to the varietal testing
299 Id. para. 206.
300 See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 274, at 65-67.
301 Id. at 67.
302 See supra note 279.
303 See Agricultural Products, supra note 238, para. 3.
304 Id.
303 Id. paras. 3, 131.
306 Id. para. 130.
307 Id. para. 131.
301 Id. paras. 85, 114.
301 Id. para. 85.
310 Id. paras. 113-14.
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requirement. 3 11 On this basis the Appellate Body recommended that Japan
bring its agricultural products import guidelines into compliance with the
SPS Agreement.312 Those who argue that the Agricultural Products case
demonstrates that sanitary measures can never survive a challenge in the
WTO dispute settlement system again appear to be according insufficient
weight to the facts of the case. Japan's varietal testing requirement clearly
was not based on scientific analysis; it was never mentioned in Japan's risk
assessment.313 Similar to the Hormones decision, the Agricultural Products
decision demonstrates only that a sanitary measure that has no rational basis
in science violates the SPS Agreement.
C. The SPS Agreement: An Effective Tool for Human Health Protection
Environmentalists often vilify the WTO because they believe that the
WTO system is indifferent or even hostile to human health concerns. 314 The
conventional wisdom among some in the environmental community is that
all of the decisions that come out of the WTO dispute settlement system
inhibit the ability of countries to protect their health and environmental
standards. 315  This view of WTO decisions, at least those decisions that
involve the SPS Agreement, is shortsighted and does not take the facts of
each individual case into consideration. At first blush, the Hormones and
Agricultural Products decisions appear to undermine human health interests;
they both declare sanitary measures that were purportedly enacted to protect
human health, inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. However, a close
consideration of the facts reveals that the decisions do not truly undermine
human health interests. In Hormones, the Appellate Body found that the
scientific studies relied upon by the EU did not support the prohibition on
the import of meat from growth hormone-treated cattle.316 In Agricultural
Products, the Appellate Body noted that the risk assessment relied upon by
Japan made no mention of Japan's varietal testing import requirements.317
Simply put, these decisions stand mostly for the proposition that
environmental or sanitary measures must be based on scientific evidence and
risk analyses.
31 Id. para. 113.
312 Id. para. 144.
313 See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
314 Kevin C. Kennedy, The Illegality of Unilateral Trade Measures to Resolve Trade-Environment
Disputes, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 375, 501-02 (1998).
315 See Chamovitz, supra note 283, at 168.
316 Hormones, supra note 178, para. 206.
317 Agricultural Products, supra note 238, para. 113.
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It is likely that those who are critical of the WTO dispute resolution
process took a cynical view of the Hormones and Agricultural Products
cases and argued that the burden of demonstrating the scientific validity of a
sanitary or environmental measure was insurmountable. However, the
dispute settlement panel decision upholding most of Australia's new salmon
import guidelines has proven otherwise. The panel upheld several import
restrictions, including a requirement for proof that the salmonid product was
derived from eviscerated, headed, non-diseased salmon that were processed
at approved premises. The requirement that salmonid product be in
"consumer-ready" form to be released from quarantine was the only part of
Australia's new import guidelines that was found to violate the SPS
Agreement.319 In short, the panel concluded that most of Australia's new
import guidelines were appropriately grounded in science and were
consistent with the SPS Agreement. The panel decision represents the first
case in which a sanitary measure was substantially upheld by the WTO and
demonstrates that WTO members can effectively protect their environmental
and health interests within the current WTO framework.
VII. CONCLUSION
One of the stated purposed of the SPS Agreement is to ensure that no
WTO member is "prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health., 320 This objective of the
SPS Agreement is subject to the caveat that the measures must not be
applied arbitrarily, unjustly, or in a manner that constitutes a disguised
321restriction on international trade. In this case, Australia has removed an
import prohibition, allowing the import of salmonids that meet several
sanitary criteria required by Australia. The dispute settlement panel upheld
most of Australia's new guidelines, reasoning that they are appropriately
based on comprehensive, detailed scientific analyses of the risk of disease
establishment in Australian fish populations and the consequences of such
establishment. The panel's decision is the first case in which a sanitary
measure was substantially upheld by the WTO, and it provides strong
evidence that the SPS Agreement is an effective tool available to WTO
members that wish to protect their human health interests.
18 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
319 See supra Parts V.A, C.
320 SPS Agreement, supra note 9, preamble, para. 1.
321 Id.
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